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Summary (50 words): This article sets out the relationship between trusteeship, agency, and 
the doctrine of ostensible authority. It argues that the judgment in Wishart v Credit and 
Mercantile incorrectly conflated the rules concerning the authority of trustees and agents, 
and also rested on a misunderstanding of the Land Registration Act 2002.  
Abstract: This article sets out the relationship between trusteeship, agency, and the doctrine 
of ostensible authority. It argues that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wishart v Credit 
and Mercantile incorrectly conflated the rules concerning the authority of trustees and agents 
in way which creates wider problems for the law of trusts. It contends that the decision 
rested on a misunderstanding of the Brocklesby principle, the doctrine of ostensible authority 
more generally, as well as the scope and purpose of the Land Registration Act 2002. It will 
be suggested that later courts should depart from the reasoning in the judgment insofar as it 
concerns both the general law and the rules governing registered land.    
I. Introduction  
 
It is uncontroversial that different legal rules apply to different legal areas. After all, 
taxonomies of law are designed to group together like cases with like, to make the law more 
consistent in its application. That is not to say that one set of facts cannot trigger a range of 
legal responses or that common rules are applied to a range of areas of law. A set of facts 
which illustrates the proposition very neatly is one in which A entrusts his property to B to 
manage.1 Such an arrangement can give rise to a relationship of trusteeship, agency, or 
indeed both relationships at once, as in cases concerning nominees and some types of 
Quistclose arrangement.2 The similarity in the scenarios which can give rise to trusteeship 
and agency are reflected in the common legal doctrines applied to trustees and agents 
entrusted with the assets of their principal. Both types of office holder owe fiduciary duties,3 
duties of care and skill,4 and custodial duties5 in respect of any assets they manage.  
It makes sense, therefore, to accept that a given set of facts can trigger multiple legal 
responses. However, to recognise that facts which always create one type of legal 
relationship by definition also create another, would fundamentally alter the working of our 
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legal categories. This is the apparent effect of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Wishart v 
Credit and Mercantile Plc,6 which provides that where A authorises B to hold assets on trust 
for A’s benefit (in whole or in part), that B will always be treated as an agent of A, with 
ostensible authority to bind A’s interest in the trust assets. The decision was justified by 
Sales LJ as an application of the principle rooted in Brocklesby v Temperance Permanent 
Building Society,7 as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Abbey National v Cann,8 which he 
treated as binding authority upon him.  
This article seeks to challenge the proposition that the doctrine of ostensible authority, a 
doctrine of the law of agency, ought to be applied in banc to trusts cases of the kind outlined 
above. Such an application is supported neither by principle nor authority. This will be 
demonstrated as follows. Part II of this article will set out the orthodox relationship between 
trusteeship, agency, and the doctrine of ostensible authority. Part III will demonstrate how 
Wishart in its application of the Brocklesby principle departs from this orthodox position. Part 
IV will examine the authorities governing the Brocklesby principle, its scope, and the extent 
to which it has been modified by later statute and common law, before evaluating the 
contention that the Court of Appeal in Wishart was bound by authority to reach the 
conclusion it did. Part V will then show the problematic implications of applying the doctrine 
of ostensible authority to the law of trusts, and Part VI will suggest how Wishart should be 
treated by later courts.  
This analysis will show that applying ostensible authority to all trusts arising from B holding 
assets for A’s benefit would fundamentally alter the nature of such trusts; undermine the land 
registration rules; and be inconsistent with the policy concerns underlying the courts’ 
reasoning in cases like William & Glyn’s Bank v Boland9 and Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge.10  It will further be contended that the court in Wishart was not as a matter of 
authority bound to apply the Brocklesby principle in the way it did, on the basis of both 
common law and statutory authority.  
II. Orthodoxy  
1. Ostensible Authority and Agency 
The doctrine of ostensible authority, sometimes referred to as apparent authority, provides 
that where A holds out B as having authority to bind him, and C deals with B in reliance on 
that representation, then B is treated as having authority to bind A vis-à-vis C, without 
reference to the actual terms of B’s authority.11 A variant of the principle, sometimes 
referred to as ‘ostensible ownership’, provides that where A enables B to appears as 
owner of A’s property, or as otherwise having powers to dispose of it, then B will be able to 
sell, charge, or pledge that property.12 
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Accordingly, the doctrine of ostensible authority regulates priorities disputes between A and 
C in cases where an agent acts without actual authority. Where A holds B out as his agent, 
and authorises him to act as such, he creates a risk that third parties will be misled into 
thinking B was authorised to act for A in ways he was not. It therefore makes sense for A to 
bear any loss arising from this risk materialising, provided that C had no reason to know that 
B was acting beyond the scope of his authority.13 Indeed, the rules on point ultimately benefit 
principals, in that they allow third parties to deal with agents confidently. In the absence of 
such a doctrine third parties might be more reluctant to do dealings with agents, therefore 
limiting the business that could be carried out using an agent. The rules also incentivise 
principals to take care in choosing who they employ as agents, presumably reducing the 
number of fraudulent agents.  
2. Trusteeship and the bona fide purchaser for value without notice defence  
On orthodox principles, the doctrine of ostensible authority has been applied to determine 
when agents acting without actual authority should be able to bind their principals, but the 
doctrine has never been applied to determine when a trustee acting in breach of trust can 
bind the beneficiary. The applicability of the doctrine to trusts was specifically rejected a 
number of times,14 and Bowstead & Reynolds makes clear that the doctrine of ‘ostensible 
ownership’ is ‘inapplicable where the principal vests property in the agent as trustee’.15 
Instead, where a trustee disposed of trust assets without authority under the terms of the 
trust, the bona fide purchaser for value defence would determine whether the beneficiary’s 
rights were bound. In its modern form, the rule provides that a bona fide purchaser for value 
of legal title to trust assets, without notice of the trust, will take that title free of the 
beneficiary’s interest.16 The defence continues to determine which unauthorised actions of a 
trustee will bind third parties in cases concerning trusts of personalty, and a few cases 
concerning unregistered land.17  
It should be emphasised that the bona fide purchaser for value defence differs from the 
doctrine of ostensible authority in four main ways, although both doctrines play the same 
function. First, a purchaser of trust assets disposed of in breach of trust can only take those 
assets free of the beneficiary’s interest if they are a bona fide purchaser of legal title for 
value. This is significant in that it means: 
(a) an agent who gives an equitable charge (or other interest less than legal title18) to 
a third party can bind his principal under the doctrine of ostensible authority, in a way 
a trustee acting beyond the terms of his powers cannot bind his beneficiary.  
 (b) under the doctrine of ostensible authority, an agent can bind his principal by 
making a gratuitous disposition in a way a trustee acting beyond the terms of his 
powers cannot bind his beneficiary.  
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Secondly, the doctrine of ostensible authority could allow an agent to bind both the credit 
and the property of his principal, whereas the bona fide purchaser defence applies only to 
trust property. Indeed, unless the trust deed gives the trustees power to grant charges over 
the trust assets, there is typically no way for a trust creditor to claim trust assets other than 
by subrogation to the trustee’s own rights.19  
Thirdly, the rationales of the doctrines are different. As above, the doctrine of ostensible 
authority is justified by the fact that a principal has held out his agent as having authority to 
bind him, and a third party has relied on that representation.20 The principal has therefore 
created the risk of third parties being misled into thinking the agent has authority he does not 
have, and so should be liable for any loss caused by that risk materialising. The bona fide 
purchaser defence cannot be understood in this way. The point is made most clear by the 
fact that the rule applies regardless of whether the beneficiary of a trust is also its settlor. 
Where this is not the case, while the existence of the trust creates the risk that third parties 
might be misled into thinking that the trustee is beneficially entitled to the trust assets, and so 
authorised to deal with them in any way he wishes, any ‘holding out’ is made by the settlor, 
not the beneficiary. The point is made especially stark by the fact that a beneficiary of a trust 
might not even know of her status as such. Instead, the defence’s incidents are best 
understood as stemming from Chancery’s historical preference for creditors for value, and its 
role in preventing fraud.21 
This leads onto the fourth and final point. The essence of the right of a beneficiary under a 
trust is that he is allowed a property right to trust assets which prima facie binds third parties, 
without having to oversee or interfere with the trustee’s management of the trust assets. 
While it makes sense to have rules to incentivise principals to oversee their agents, as by 
definition they will appoint their agents, the nature of a trust beneficiary’s rights would be 
fundamentally altered were a trustee treated as having authority to bind the beneficiary’s 
rights in all cases. The significance of such a potential change was recognised Lord Cairns 
LC in Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co v R.22 His Lordship rejected an argument 
that a single trustee of shares, by being given legal title to those shares, had ostensible 
authority always to bind the beneficiary’s interest in those shares. He argued that doing so 
would put an ‘equitable owner…under some measure of obligation with regard to his duty of 
watching his trustee’, and in so doing would ‘cut down’ the ‘large, well-known, recognised, 
and admitted system of trusts in this country’.23  
3. Statute and Trusts of Registered Land  
In the above section we have seen the differences between the doctrine of ostensible 
authority and the bona fide purchaser defence in trusts law. The law concerning trusts of 
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land, in particular registered land, is no longer wholly24 governed by Chancery’s historical 
doctrines, and the extent to which dispositions of land made in breach of trust bind 
beneficiary interests is now determined by statute. The two provisions on point are section 6 
of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, which applies to all trusts of 
land, and section 29 of the Land Registration Act 2002, which applies only to registered land. 
Both bear further consideration in that they fundamentally alter the way the priorities rules 
apply to trusts of land. 
Section 6 of TOLATA 1996 concerns the ‘General powers of trustees’, and provides that ‘For 
the purpose of exercising their functions as trustees, the trustees of land have in relation to 
the land subject to the trust all the powers of an absolute owner’. In other words, the section 
provides that a trustee of land is to be treated as having no limits in equity on his authority or 
powers under the trust, unless this power is expressly limited.25 The significance of this is 
that trustees of land are to be treated as always having the power to bind the beneficiaries of 
that land, and their dispositions will therefore always overreach the interests of beneficiaries 
provided the requirements of section 27 of the Law of Property Act 1925 are met. This 
restriction is an important one: it provides that a beneficiary’s interest will not be 
overreached, unless the conveyance is made by a Trust Corporation or two or more 
trustees.  
Section 29 of the LRA 2002 replaces the bona fide purchaser defence in respect of trusts of 
registered land.26 It provides that a purchaser of land for valuable consideration who 
registers the interest they purchase,27 will take free of off-register interests affecting the land 
before the time of disposition, unless those interests are overriding interests under Schedule 
3. The most significant category of overriding interests is that of persons in actual occupation 
under Schedule 3, paragraph 2. It should be noted that beneficial interests under a trust 
cannot be registered, nor entered on the register as notices, meaning that interests under 
trusts are always defeated by the section unless they are overriding interests.28 
The purpose of these statutory provisions is the subject of extensive commentary elsewhere, 
but it is possible to summarise the arguments on point as follows.29 The current English law 
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regime for trusts of registered land take as a starting point that trustees can freely dispose of 
the trust assets, binding the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries will typically only be able to claim 
they keep their beneficial interest and priority where (i) there has not been a disposition by 
two trustees or Trust Corporation30 and (ii) the beneficiaries are in actual occupation of the 
land.31 The regime is designed to promote the marketability of land, and so favours third 
party purchasers over beneficiaries except in cases of owner-possessors.  
It goes without saying that the policies behind the rules governing priorities disputes in the 
context of trusts of land are specific, and very different to those underlying the doctrine of 
ostensible authority. The provisions of the LRA 2002 on point are clearly driven by a 
recognition that there is need to protect beneficiaries who live in the property in which they 
have an interest under a trust. 
III. The Problem 
The decision Wishart v Credit Mercantile plc32 has challenged the orthodox account of the 
relationship between trusts and agency set out in Part II. In brief, Sales LJ ruled that 
beneficiary of a trust of registered land in actual occupation, who had allowed a third party to 
buy the property on his behalf, was bound by a mortgage entered into by the trustee without 
authorisation. The decision was justified by Sales LJ on the basis that the beneficiary had 
given the trustee ‘“free rein” to make arrangements for the acquisition…[and] exercised no 
supervisory function whatever in relation to what [the trustee] might do to effect the 
transaction’,33 by applying what he described as the Brocklesby principle, because the 
beneficiary had furnished the trustee ‘with the means to hold himself out as the true 
beneficial purchaser’ of the property.34 In brief, the judgment appears to treat trustees as 
having ostensible authority to bind the interests of trust beneficiaries in all cases where the 
beneficiaries have allowed the trustees to hold or acquire legal title to trust assets. The 
remainder of the article will examine this proposition in light of the orthodox account of the 
relationship between trusteeship and agency set out above.  
IV. The Authorities 
1. Brockelsby v Temperance Permanent Building Society 
In Wishart, the application of the doctrine of ostensible authority to trusts law was said to 
be rooted in the decision in Brocklesby v Temperance Permanent Building Society.35 The 
facts of the case can be summarised as follows. A and B were father and son, and 
partners in a solicitors firm. A authorised B to borrow £2250 on the security of mortgages 
and real property belonging to A. B, on the security in question, borrowed £3600 instead. 
The House of Lords had ot decide whether to allow A to redeem the security by paying 
only £2,250 to the mortgagee—that is to say the sum B was authorised to borrow—or 
whether to treat the mortgage as securing the full £3,600 borrowed by B. Accordingly, the 
main issue before the court was whether B had bound A under the doctrine of ostensible 
authority on the basis that A had given B the title deeds to his properties.  
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The House of Lords ultimately found in favour of the mortgagee. In the leading judgment, 
which was echoed in the reasoning of the rest of the court, Lord Herschell LC made clear 
that B did have actual authority as an agent to borrow money on the mortgage deeds and, 
further, there were no facts to indicate to the lenders ‘that [B] was limited to a borrowing 
power of £2250, or to put [the mortgagee] upon inquiry in any respect with reference to any 
such limit of authority. The transaction was a perfectly natural one’.36 In brief, the fact that B 
had authority to borrow £2250 on the deed was sufficient to confer upon him ostensible 
authority to borrow more than that sum, as there were no circumstances to put lenders on 
notice of the limitations of the agent’s authority. Lord Herschell LC justified his decision using 
the doctrine of ostensible authority.37 A had held B out as having authority to bind A vis-à-vis 
the lender-mortgagee. In particular, A had created the risk that third parties would think B 
was entitled to borrow more than £2250 on the security of the title deeds, and so it was right 
that A bear the loss caused by that risk materialising. It is clear therefore that the case was 
entirely concerned with agency, and the question of when the doctrine of ostensible authority 
could apply in respect of an agent entrusted with title deeds who had actual authority to 
borrow money.  
2. Rimmer v Webster 
The applicability of Brocklesby was considered by Farwell J in the Chancery Division of the 
High Court in Rimmer v Webster.38 A transferred shares into B’s name, with the intention 
that B (a broker) should sell the shares, and give the proceeds to A. The transfer stated that 
A had sold the shares to B, and B had paid, though B had not done so. B later mortgaged 
the shares to C. B became a bankrupt and died, and A sought to recover the shares from B’s 
estate. C claimed that its mortgage over the shares had priority over A’s claim.  
The main issue before the court was the applicability of the doctrine of ostensible authority 
as stated in Brocklesby. For A, it was argued that Brocklesby and the doctrine of ostensible 
authority simply did not apply because B had been a trustee for A, and not an agent, and the 
cases in which it was decided that the doctrine did not apply to trusts were cited.39 For C, it 
was argued that B was an agent for A: A had employed B as a broker to sell shares on his 
behalf. The fact that legal title was transferred to B, making him a trustee de facto, did not 
prevent B from also being an agent for A.  
Farwell J ruled for C, effectively finding that B had been both an agent and trustee. He ruled 
that A transferring legal title to B upon trust for A’s benefit was not sufficient to give B 
ostensible authority to bind A’s rights: 
A man is entitled to…vest his property in the name of another person and hand him the title-
deeds, without thereby giving rise to any implication inconsistent with his own beneficial title, [ie 
he could settle property on trust for himself] because his acts are in accordance with the 
common usage of mankind; and no other member of the community, therefore, is entitled to 
allege that such a course of action contains any invitation to him to act, from which a duty to 
him can be inferred.
40
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However, on the facts of the case, A was deemed to have given his agent B ‘the means of 
representing himself as the beneficial owner’ of A’s shares, and so had been held out to the 
world as having authority to bind A’s interest in the shares.41 On that basis, B was treated as 
having ostensible authority over the shares. The judgment recognises that the doctrine of 
ostensible authority does not apply to trustees per se, but that cases can arise in which a 
trustee is already the agent of a settlor-beneficiary. It would be arbitrary to treat the fact that 
a principal transferred legal title to the agent as preventing the doctrine from operating. It is 
important to emphasise that Farwell J did not see A giving B management powers and 
indicia of title as automatically conferring upon B ostensible authority to bind A: some further 
circumstance would be needed. On the facts, that circumstance was the pre-existing agency 
relationship between A and B, but Farwell J set out no rules for determining what other facts 
might suffice. 
3. Burgis v Constantine 
The decision in Rimmer was considered by the Court of Appeal in Burgis v Constantine.42 
One of the judges who heard the case was Farwell LJ, the same judge who decided Rimmer 
in the High Court. It is odd that Brocklesby and Rimmer have been cited by modern courts 
as setting the scope of the Brocklesby principle, but that Burgis has not. The case clarifies 
the relationship between the principle in relation to both agency and trusts, and also shows 
how the doctrine of ostensible authority was seen to interact with a statutory registration 
regime: that created by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.43 
The facts of the case are as follows. A and B intended to set up a company to own a ship, A 
transferred his shares of the ship in to B’s name, which were duly registered in B’s name in 
the manner required by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. The scheme was later abandoned, 
but B kept the shares in his name, and A did not seek re-conveyance. B later mortgaged the 
shares to C. If the formalities for the mortgage of the shares had complied with the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894, then C as a disponee of their registered owner would have taken free of 
A’s interests, which were off the register.44 Indeed, beneficial interests in trusts for shares of 
ships could not be registered.45 For reasons which are unimportant, the statutory 
requirements were not complied with.46 C nevertheless claimed priority over A, citing 
Rimmer in support of the proposition that B had ostensible authority to mortgage the shares 
to C.  
The issue in the case therefore came down to whether C, unable to rely on a statutory 
defence to A’s claim, could nevertheless appeal to the doctrine of ostensible authority. A’s 
counsel argued that he could not, and that the doctrine was not triggered by the mere fact 
that A had given legal title to B. C’s counsel contended that A transferring legal title to B was 
sufficient to effectively make B an agent of A, and so able to bind A’s property under the 
doctrine of ostensible authority.  
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At trial, the High Court found for A, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, for 
two reasons. First, it was held unanimously that as the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 provided 
a defence to purchasers from registered owners, that it must implicitly have superseded any 
alternative general law avenue of redress for such purchasers. In particular, it was 
emphasised that the fact the statute prevented beneficial shares being placed on the register 
showed that the defence in the Act was meant to be exhaustive, and excluded general law 
principles.47 This first point is one to which many modern land lawyers will be sympathetic.  
Secondly, it was ruled that the mere fact that A had put title in B’s name (and the fact A had 
not recovered the title after their venture was abandoned), was not sufficient to confer upon 
B ostensible authority to bind A. In particular, Fletcher Moulton LJ and Farwell LJ 
emphasised that A’s actions could not be seen to make B an agent of A with authority to 
bind him in this way. Of particular interest is Farwell LJ’s explanation of his reasoning in 
Rimmer. In particular, he emphasised that in Rimmer he had not decided that trustees would 
all have ostensible authority to bind beneficiaries, but that they would only do so in 
circumstances where the trustee was deemed to have ostensible authority under the ‘usual 
doctrines of agency’, and that ‘[t]he observations relied upon by the defendant’s counsel [in 
Rimmer]…were directed to the question of agency, not of trusteeship’.48 On the facts of 
Rimmer and indeed Brocklesby, this point was uncontroversial: both cases involved 
expressly appointed commercial agents.  
4. The pre-Wishart home ownership cases 
As shown above, the decision in both Brocklesby and Rimmer were commercial agency 
cases decided at the turn of the nineteenth century, concerning the scope of an agent’s 
authority to bind the property of his principal. In a number of late twentieth century and early 
twenty first century cases, courts dealing with non-commercial cases concerning joint 
ownership and trusts of land have purported to apply the doctrine of ostensible authority or, 
as they have termed it, the Brocklesby principle.   
In the following cases, B purchased a house for A, or for A and B, and then mortgaged it to 
C. It is worthy of note that in these cases A was aware that B would have had to take out a 
mortgage to purchase the house. In Abbey National v Cann49 Dillon LJ in the Court of 
Appeal (with the agreement of the rest of the court), held that the fact that A knew B was 
buying a property for them jointly, but did not have the sums to do so, meant that A had 
authorised B to mortgage the property.50 B was treated as an agent with authority to raise 
mortgage money and under Brocklesby, therefore had ostensible authority to raise any sum 
on the mortgage: the fact B had raised more than he was authorised to was irrelevant. The 
reasoning was approved of obiter by Lord Oliver in the House of Lords on appeal in the 
same case.51 The reasoning in Cann was echoed in two later High Court cases. In 
Thompson v Foy,52 Lewison J ruled that a party with authority to mortgage property had 
ostensible authority to mortgage it beyond the scope of his actual authority. He considered 
the reasoning in Cann, as going beyond an inquiry as to the actual consent of the parties, 
and involving ‘a much broader principle, akin to estoppel’, presumably referencing the 
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doctrine of ostensible authority. The same principles were set out in Bank of Scotland v 
Hussain,53 where Newey J saw the Brocklesby principle as wider than either the doctrine of 
ostensible authority in agency cases, or an enquiry as to whether A consented, or indeed 
estoppel.54 These cases were relied upon as authority in Wishart.55  
It is clear in all these cases that A had given B implied actual authority to mortgage the 
property, because A was aware that B could not have purchased the property without a 
mortgage. For this reason, as in Brocklesby itself, B had ostensible authority to raise any 
sum by mortgaging the property without reference to the limitations of his actual authority. 
Accordingly, the cases do not stand for the proposition that B would have had ostensible 
authority to bind A, if A had never authorised B to mortgage the property. The point is made 
most clearly in Skipton Building Society v Clayton.56 In that case, Sir Christopher Slade in 
the Court of Appeal emphasised the centrality of A’s actual consent in Cann. On this basis, 
he ruled that A could not be bound by a mortgage taken out by B where A was unaware of 
the mortgage, or (on the facts of the case) where A  (lessees rather than trust beneficiaries) 
were unaware that their rights would be affected by a mortgage (taken out by the freehold 
owner). It should be stressed that this is the most recent pre-Wishart Court of Appeal case 
concerning the Brocklesby principle.  
5. Ostensible authority and section 29 of the LRA 2002 
Before moving onto Wishart itself, it should be noted that there is a strong argument that 
section 29 of the LRA 2002 excluded the doctrine of ostensible authority from cases 
concerning registered land altogether.  
As above, the provision is accepted to have replaced the bona fide purchaser defence in 
respect of trusts of land,57 and this begs the question of whether it replaced the doctrine of 
ostensible authority in relation to land too. Although the doctrine is distinct from the bona fide 
purchaser defence, as discussed in Part II, it historically played a functionally equivalent role.  
More specifically, while the extent to which the LRA 2002 modified the general law priorities 
rules remains a matter of controversy,58 the drafting and context of section 29 suggest that 
the provision is deliberately designed to exclude the concept of ‘notice’ in determining the 
outcome of priority disputes in relation to registered land.59 Given that the concept of ‘notice’ 
as applied in the bona fide purchase defence appears to be the same as that applied in 
respect of the doctrine of ostensible authority, it would not make sense for the section to 
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exclude the former doctrine but not the latter.60 It is therefore seriously arguable that the 
application of Brocklesby in the context of registered land has been excluded by statute. 
After all, a key purpose of the LRA 2002 is to make the issue of what a purchaser knew or 
ought to have known irrelevant in relation to priority disputes concerning registered land, the 
outcome of which instead should be determined by section 29 and Schedule 3. Given that 
the doctrine of ostensible authority centres entirely on whether a purchaser has any way of 
knowing whether an agent is acting without actual authority, then surely it has no role to play 
in registered land disputes? This position supported by the reasoning in Burgis v 
Constantine,61 where the registration and purchaser provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894 were deemed to exclude purchasers of shares in a ship from relying on the doctrine.  
An implication of this reasoning would be that the High Court in Foy and Hussein, when 
dealing with land registered under the LRA 2002, were wrong to apply the 1989 decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Cann.  
6. Wishart v Credit and Mercantile Plc 
Having explored the history of the Brocklesby principle the decision in Wishart v Credit and 
Mercantile itself can be reconsidered. The facts of the case broadly mirror those considered 
it the home ownership cases above. A had authorised B to purchase a house for A, which 
was registered in B’s name, and B had mortgaged to C. There were two important 
differences, however, between the Wishart and the cases considered above. First, A and B 
had business dealings with one another, and B was effectively a commercial agent for A. 
Secondly, A had not authorised B to mortgage the property, and a mortgage was not 
necessary for the purchase.  
Sales LJ, with the agreement of Tomlinson LJ and Longmore LJ, found that C had priority 
over A, because A had allowed B ‘free rein’ in his management of the property, and had not 
overseen B’s exercise of his authority. He justified his decision on the basis of what looks 
very much like ostensible authority: 
The Brocklesby principle is not based on actual authority given to the agent, but rather on a 
combination of factors: actual authority given by the owner of an asset to a person authorised 
to deal with it in some way on his behalf; where the owner has furnished the agent with the 
means of holding himself out to a purchaser or lender as the owner of the asset or as having 
the full authority of the owner to deal with it; together with an omission by the owner to bring to 
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the attention of a person dealing with the agent any limitation that exists as to the extent of the 
actual authority of the agent. This combination of factors creates a situation in which it is fair, as 
between the owner of the asset and the innocent purchaser or lender, that the owner should 
bear the risk of fraud on the part of the agent whom he has set in motion and provided (albeit 
unwittingly) with the means of perpetrating the fraud.
62 
Applying these principles, Sales LJ ruled that A had to be bound by C, because A, in 
allowing B to purchase the property for A in B’s own name, had enabled B to hold himself as 
having authority to bind A’s interest. He cited Brocklesby, Rimmer, and the pre-Wishart 
home ownership cases in support of this proposition. 
This conclusion is difficult to justify both as a matter of both authority and principle. First, the 
court does not appear to have fully considered whether the doctrine of ostensible authority 
was applicable to registered land. Sales LJ seems to have accepted that the Brocklesby did 
apply, because of the requirement that an ‘overriding interest’ under the LRA 2002 be one 
with priority against a purchaser under the general law. However, this reasoning does not 
deal with the question of whether section 29 of the LRA 2002 superseded the doctrine of 
ostensible authority in the same way it superseded the bona fide purchaser defence.63  
Secondly, it is not clear how A’s failure to oversee B’s management of the assets amounted 
to a ‘holding out’ of B’s authority. Is it seriously suggested that C’s position would have been 
affected if A, behind the scenes, had overseen B’s conduct, but B had nevertheless 
managed to mortgage the property to C? 
Thirdly, Brocklesby and the pre-Wishart homeownership cases only concerned scenarios 
where B was authorised to mortgage A’s property, but charged the property beyond the sum 
authorised by A. A’s actual consent to B’s mortgaging the property was central to these 
cases, as emphasised in Skipton Building Society v Clayton, which should have been 
formally binding on the court in Wishart (given that the court did not consider the LRA 2002 
to have superseded the application of Brocklesby to registered land). The only case which 
suggested that A, by conferring legal title and authority to deal with property upon B, could 
give B ostensible authority was Rimmer. However, as above, Farwell LJ in Rimmer and 
Burgis did not state that this would always be the case, and only found ostensible authority 
on the facts of Rimmer because of the pre-existing agency relationship between A and B.  
The absence of such a relationship justified the court in Burgis reaching the opposite 
conclusion. The difficulty with Wishart is that it suggests that all cases where A gives B title 
or indicia of title that B will have ostensible authority to bind A without any additional factor. 
Although Sales LJ justified his reasoning by reference to the fact that A had left B to manage 
the property and its purpose, for such ‘negligence’ to confer ostensible authority upon B, 
according to the authorities some further element would have been needed to create a duty 
between A and C.64 Although, on the facts of the case, B was a commercial agent for A, 
Sales LJ did not rely on this in his reasoning. 
 The conclusion therefore goes further than previous judgments, and is hard to justify as a 
matter of policy. Is it now to be thought that C will automatically take priority over A 
whenever A entrusts his or her affairs to B under the doctrine of ostensible authority, even 
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where A’s actual consent was procured by misrepresentation or undue influence?65 Are we 
to understand that in all cases where A gives B money to purchase property which he is to 
hold on trust and manage, that B will have complete authority to bind A if A does not oversee 
B’s transaction and management? As Dixon has argued, a general rule of this type would 
certainly seem to fly in the face of William & Glyn’s Bank v Boland.66 
V. Implications: the authority of trustees 
This fifth part of this article will consider the possible implications of the decision in Wishart 
for trusts law, and will focus on the effect of the decision on the authority of trustees and the 
rights of beneficiaries. As above, the doctrine of ‘ostensible authority’ historically was applied 
to cases of agency but not to cases of trusts, and ‘transplanting’ it to trusts law creates 
issues in relation to both trusts of land and personalty.  
1. Which types of trusts does the decision affect? 
Sales LJ’s reasoning in Wishart suggests that the doctrine of ostensible authority will be 
applied to any case where A allows B to put trust property in which A has an interest in B’s 
name alone, even where A has not given B any specific orders relating to the purchase of 
trust assets or management of the fund. This factual scenario could presumably involve 
cases of land or personalty, and would usually encompass (i) purchase money resulting 
trusts, (ii) express trusts in favour of a settlor and (iii) cases where B acquires (or already 
has) legal title to realty under which A has (or acquires) a purely equitable share under a 
common intention constructive trust. In such cases, the trustee will be treated as having 
authority to dispose of or bind A’s interest in favour of third parties regardless of the terms of 
the trust. In the following two sections the different effects of the decision on trusts of realty 
and personalty will be considered. In those sections the term ‘trusts’ will be used to refer to 
the three types of trust affected by Wishart.  
2. Trusts of Realty  
In cases of the type outlined above, where the trust in question concerns realty, Wishart has 
the effect of removing one of the few remaining safeguards available to beneficiaries of such 
trusts. Although section 6 of TOLATA provides that trustees are already treated as prima 
facie having authority to bind beneficiaries’ interests, at present a trustee will only bind a 
beneficiary’s interest where the disposition is made by two or more trustees or a Trust 
Corporation, thereby triggering overreaching. In such cases, the beneficiaries of a trust have 
a right to claim trust assets. The decision in Wishart, by transplanting the agency rule into 
trusts, would seem to short circuit this mechanism. The decision effectively removes the 
‘two-trustee’ rule, by allowing purchasers to gain priority over beneficiaries in all cases 
simply under the doctrine of ostensible authority. For instance, imagine a scenario where 
husband and wife buy a house, and the wife allows her husband to put the house in his 
name alone, and gives him no other instructions. Later, the husband mortgages the property 
without his wife’s consent. Under Wishart, the mortgagee would have priority automatically, 
simply due to the existence of the trust: though no overreaching could occur, and even if the 
mortgagee had not registered the mortgage. Further, if the mortgagee had sought the wife’s 
consent, obtained her signature, but had failed to follow the Etridge protocol, and the 
signature turned out to be procured by misrepresentation or undue influence, under the ratio 
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of Wishart the mortgagee would presumably have priority simply due to the existence of the 
trust triggering the doctrine of ostensible authority.   
This is perilously close to a blanket rule that beneficiaries of such trusts lose priority disputes 
automatically, rendering Schedule 3 paragraph 2 of the LRA 2002 otiose. It is therefore hard 
to imagine that the drafters of the LRA 2002 contemplated such a principle as surviving the 
Act, and would seem to upset any balance between the rights of purchasers and 
beneficiaries of trusts of land that the law already strikes, in that such a beneficiary would 
almost never be able assert her right against a third party disponee.67 Indeed, in policy terms 
the desirability of a rule which dis-incentivises mortgagee-banks to undertake proper checks 
before taking mortgage charges is questionable at best.  
3. Trusts of Personalty 
Wishart itself concerned a trust of land, but the ratio of the decision appears to have further 
implications for trusts of personalty. Whereas section 6 of TOLATA 1996 provides trustees of 
land with a general authority to dispose of trust assets, there is no equivalent trusts law 
doctrine governing trusts of personalty, and so no general mechanism whereby the interests 
of beneficiaries of trusts of personality will be bound in favour of dispones of trust assets. 
However, to treat a trustee of personalty as having ostensible authority to bind the 
beneficiary would be effectively to reverse this position, in that all dispositions in favour of 
third parties would automatically bind beneficiaries, regardless of whether or not they were in 
breach of trust. In other words, the ratio of Wishart would appear to bring about the same 
end result in priorities disputes concerning trusts of personalty of the types set out above, as 
section 6 effects in respect of trusts of land.  Although in many cases a purchaser who 
manages to successfully invoke the doctrine of ostensible authority would also be able to 
plead the bona fide purchaser defence, the decision in Wishart changes the default position 
of purchasers of trust assets and, as above, provides additional protection to gratuitous 
disponees of trustees and those who take equitable charges from trustees.68   
Indeed, the decision undermines the right of a beneficiary of all such trusts to retain a 
proprietary interest in trust assets, assert-able against third party disponees, whilst having 
his property managed by another, free of the ‘duty of watching’ Lord Cairns LC referred to in 
Shropshire Union Railways.69  
VI. Conclusion: What should the law be? 
This article opened with the trite observation that different legal rules apply in different legal 
areas, very often for good reasons, and that doctrines cannot be readily transplanted from 
one area to another without creating problems. It has been shown that an example of such a 
troublesome ‘transplant’ is the decision in Wishart to apply in banc the doctrine of ostensible 
authority to cases involving (i) purchase money resulting trusts (ii) express trusts for a settlor 
and (iii) common intention constructive trusts where one or more beneficial owners do not 
have legal title. While the doctrine’s application in agency cases makes perfect sense, its 
application in the trusts law context radically alters the nature of the rights of the 
beneficiaries of such trusts; undermines the land registration rules; and appears inconsistent 
with the policy concerns underlying the courts’ reasoning in cases like Boland and Etridge. 
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Further, the court in Wishart was not bound by authority to reach such a conclusion: indeed 
both the LRA 2002 and Skipton Building Society v Clayton militated against the conclusion 
reached by Sales LJ.   
Given the problems created by taking the reasoning in Wishart, the natural question arises of 
how the case should be treated going forward. It is submitted that there are two (not 
inconsistent) potential ways of doing this. 
The first is to emphasise the commercial context of the case and the fact that there was a 
pre-existing agency relationship between A and B, explaining B’s ostensible authority to bind 
A. This would involve adopting Skipton as good law and would justify the result in Wishart 
without creating wider problems for the law of trusts. The merit of this approach is that it 
allows these problems to be solved simply by reference to the orthodox interpretation of the 
general law, without having to resolve the ongoing thorny issue of the extent to which the 
LRA 2002 modified the general law priority rules. It also prevents the reasoning in Wishart 
being applied both within and without the context of registered land.  
The second solution would be simpler and is not inconsistent with the first. As above, the 
doctrine of ostensible authority ought to have been superseded by section 29 of the LRA 
2002 in the context of priorities disputes concerning registered land, as the purpose of the 
section was to exclude consideration of ‘notice’ from cases of that kind. After all, ‘notice’ is a 
key part of the doctrine of ostensible authority. This second solution, however, would only be 
a partial solution if adopted alone. If the interpretation of the doctrine of ostensible authority 
in Wishart were treated as a correct understanding of the general law, and excluded from 
trusts of registered land only by the LRA 2002, then the ruling would still affect trusts of other 
types.  
On that basis, this article recommends that both solutions be adopted. On this approach, the 
reasoning in Wishart would be departed from, and the reasoning in Skipton be adopted as 
the correct interpretation of the Brocklesby principle. This would prevent Wishart from being 
applied in cases of trusts of unregistered land and personalty. However, the doctrine of 
ostensible authority would be excluded altogether from cases concerning registered land by 
section 29 of the LRA 2002.  The purpose of that provision is clearly to force courts to 
determine priority disputes between purchasers of registered land and pre-existing interest 
holders by reference to the entries on the register and schedule 3 rather than the knowledge 
(actual or constructive) of the purchaser herself.  The question of whether a purchaser 
actually had any way of knowing the extent of a trustee’s authority should be irrelevant to 
this inquiry. Wishart, by transplanting an agency doctrine into trusts law, by the back door re-
introduces the doctrine of notice into priorities disputes concerning registered land. The 
reasoning is inconsistent with both the nature of the rights of trust beneficiaries and the aims 
of the LRA 2002, and so should be departed from by later courts.  
 
